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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, declared
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA” or “the Act”) the “most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species
ever enacted by any nation.”1  The Court declared that species protec-
tion must be achieved at any cost.2  This decision, more than any
other, set the tone for future interpretations of the Act.3  Depending
on one’s worldview, the ESA can be described in vastly different
ways, but one description has prevailed: it is “the pit bull of federal
environmental statutes.”4  It has the power to “alter the behavior of
† Author Bio: J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, Spring
2014; B.B.A, University of North Texas, 2011; Notes & Comments Editor, Texas
A&M Journal of Real Property Law, 2013–2014.
1. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
2. Id. at 184.
3. Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its
Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (citing Rich-
ard Littell, Endangered and Other Protected Species: Federal Law and Regulation, 3
(1992)).
4. Address by Donald Barry, Majority Counsel, House of Representatives,
Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, Am. Bar Ass’n Section on Nat. Res., Energy
and Envtl. Law, Workshop on Endangered Species (Apr. 6, 1990) (cited in Robert
245
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the largest and most powerful institutions in the nation.”5  Section 7 of
the Act restricts federal government action that affects endangered
species, which was enough to ruffle plenty of feathers in Congress.6
However, one section alone causes the most controversy among land-
owners and ecologists—section 9.  This prohibits actions by any pri-
vate citizen or municipality that might result in the take of an
endangered or threatened species.7 Take is defined in the Act as “to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,
or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”8
Anyone who owns a piece of real property that happens to contain
the habitat of a listed species can take no action that may harm that
habitat and, in turn, that species.9  This, in effect, establishes strict
land-use limitations on private landowners.  The recent expansion and
enforcement of section 9 evinces the “ESA’s inevitable progression
from the regulation of federal agency activities to the regulation of
private and local governmental actions.”10  This notion of placing
animal protection (no matter how small the species) above the needs
of property owners has become increasingly criticized since the Act’s
inception.11
After World War II, the United States experienced an unprece-
dented growth in urbanization and industrialization.12  The ESA was a
reactionary response to a rising conviction that humans were extin-
guishing plant and animal species at an alarming rate.13  For many, the
reasons for species conservation were economic.14  Proponents of the
Act felt that there might be a possibility for the future use of species
in new medicines and to attract eco-tourists to exotic areas.15  For
most, the reasons were more altruistic—plant and animal species have
Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning
Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605 (1991)).
5. Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Con-
servation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605,
605–606 (1991).
6. Sugg, supra note 3, at 2.
7. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538 (West 2012); see also,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., HCP HANDBOOK 1–1, avail-
able at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCPBKTOC.PDF [hereinafter
HCP HANDBOOK].
8. § 1532.
9. See generally George C. Coggins & Irmas Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail
Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J.
1433, 1433–34 (1982).
10. Thornton, supra note 5, at 606.
11. Laurence Michael Bogert, That’s My Story and I’m Stickin’ to It: Is the “Best
Available” Science Any Available Science Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31
IDAHO L. REV. 85, 87 (1994).
12. Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion over
Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 490, 492 (2008).
13. Id. at 492–93.
14. Id. at 493.
15. Id.
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intrinsic value, humans cannot play God, and a world of variety
trumps a world of homogeneity.16
As high-minded and environmentally conscious as that sentiment
may be, landowners can argue that they hold ancient land-use rights
that should not be infringed upon because a protected species of in-
sect resides on their property.17  Are landowners not entitled to use
the land they have purchased as they choose?  The decision is almost
indisputable if the endangered species in question is a bald eagle.  On
the contrary, when the debate is centered upon a fly or a small fish,18
opinions can vary widely as to whether the species warrants such a
strict limitation on property rights.
Congress addressed these concerns in 1982 by giving landowners
recourse to avoid prosecution as section 9 violators—the incidental
take provision in section 10.  This provides landowners with the oppor-
tunity to apply for an incidental take permit.19  If the land in question
encompasses the habitat of a listed species, and the landowners would
like to make improvements that may result in the destruction of that
habitat, they can submit a plan detailing how they will mitigate the
damage.20  These plans have come to be known as “habitat conserva-
tion plans” (“HCP”).21  Even though an incidental take permit is a
boon to landowners previously at the mercy of the ESA, HCPs are not
universally prized.
For some owners, developing and initiating an HCP is cost prohibi-
tive.22  With margins already thin on many commercial developments,
it is easy to see how a landowner would be reluctant to increase ex-
penses by attempting to develop a property while making a solid ef-
fort to preserve a species as well.  In some cases, under section 10,
owners can apply for a hardship exemption from section 9 liability.23
If an individual enters into a contract affecting a species that is subse-
quently listed as endangered or threatened, and it will cause him un-
due economic hardship under the contract, the Secretaries of
Commerce or the Interior may exempt him from application of sec-
tion 9.24  This exemption is of limited scope and is not available to
those whose land contains a species that was listed before they en-
tered into the purchase contract.25  The Act gives sole discretion to
16. Id.
17. See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of the U.S. v. Babbit, 949 F. Supp.
1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
18. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
19. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539 (West 2012).
20. See id.
21. HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1–2.
22. Rufus C. Young, Jr., 2008 Update: How The Federal Endangered Species Act
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the Secretary as to who qualifies for an exemption.26  Even with these
provisions, it stands to reason that many landowners may be reticent
to develop a property knowing that they also may have to initiate a
restrictive and expensive HCP.
Both sides of the debate have strong reasons for disliking section
10.  After a brief discussion of HCPs and their history in Part II, this
Comment will evaluate the best arguments from both landowners and
preservationists in Parts III and V.  Parts IV and VI will discuss case
history supporting both sides.  Part VII will then discuss the philoso-
phy of eco-pragmatism and recommend that resourcists and landown-
ers should adopt some of its principles regarding adaptive
management and HCPs.  Within this Section, the Author will argue
that the advantages to pragmatism in constitutional law that Daniel
Farber submitted in 1988 are perfectly suited to the conflicts presented
by modern HCPs, and it is essential for landowners to understand this.
Further, the ESA must be revised to make HCPs less complicated and
more cost-effective for landowners, so that it will be reasonable for
them to develop operative plans.  HCPs are really the only viable op-
tion we have for addressing the needs of vastly different competing
interests.  These tools for conservation must be embraced and
strengthened, so they can successfully and efficiently preserve species.
II. WHAT ARE HCPS?
The ESA charges the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce
with the development of endangered species lists, which automatically
activate protections.27  Ninety percent of the endangered or threat-
ened species that are listed reside on private land, and two-thirds have
at least sixty percent of their total habitat on private land.28  Before
the amendments of 1982, private parties engaged in otherwise lawful
activities that resulted in the taking of an endangered species were
subject to section 9 liability and had no legal recourse.29  Up to that
point, only conservation actions and scientific research that resulted in
takings were authorized under the ESA.30  The purpose of HCPs and
incidental take permits is to authorize the incidental take of a listed
species—these were not intended to authorize the underlying activi-
ties that cause the take in the first place.31  Section 10(a)(2)(B) re-
quires the following from an HCP before a permit will be issued:
26. Id.
27. Wyman, supra note 12, at 493–94.
28. Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Crea-
tive Partnerships?, 16 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV’T 94, 94 (Fall 2001) (citing David
Wilcove et al., Rebuilding the Ark: Toward a More Effective Endangered Species Act
for Private Land, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10, 701 (1998)).
29. HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1–1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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“(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, mini-
mize and mitigate the impacts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan
will be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
survival and recovery of the species in the wild; and”
(v) any other measures required by the Secretary must be met.32
Congress not only intended this process to provide recourse to pri-
vate parties engaged in otherwise lawful land use, but also to provide
a way “to reduce conflicts between listed species and economic devel-
opment activities, and to provide a framework that would encourage
‘creative partnerships’ between the public and private sectors and
state, municipal, and Federal agencies in the interests of endangered
and threatened species and habitat conservation.”33  Congress sought
to develop a climate of cooperation and to resolve the inherent
conflict that had arisen between species protection and economic
activities on private lands.34  With these changes, landowners could
undertake development projects with assurances from the federal gov-
ernment that, as long as they continued to follow their approved plan,
they would not be prosecuted under section 9.
Surprisingly, in the twelve years following the addition of the HCP
provision in 1982, the federal government approved only fourteen
HCPs, and most of those were very limited in scope, addressing only a
few species.35  In 1994, Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior under
President Clinton, undertook an ambitious administrative reform plan
to increase habitat conservation on private lands.36  Babbitt formed a
two-part agenda that sought to appease both resourcists and environ-
mentalists, and balance their interests through a reinterpretation of
the ESA.37  One part of his agenda focused on ecosystem-level habitat
management that would enhance species conservation.38  Secondly,
Babbitt’s agenda gave a voice and fair recourse to landowners inad-
vertently barred from land use by the section 9 takings prohibition.39
This agenda directly led to many regulatory innovations.40  Babbitt’s
reforms included safe harbor and candidate conservation agreements,
but HCPs and their accompanying assurances (although in existence
32. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (West 2012).
33. HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1–2 (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 97-835
(1982)).
34. Id.
35. Thornton, supra note 28, at 95.
36. Id. at 94.
37. J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV.
885, 931 (2003).
38. Id. at 886–87; see generally DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM (1999).
39. Ruhl, supra note 37, at 918–919.
40. Id. at 937.
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before the reforms) were the centerpiece of the program.41  After
these reforms, the use of HCPs rose steeply.42  Between 1993 and
1997, two hundred HCPs were approved.43  At their essence, the Bab-
bitt reforms were meant to “encourage landowners voluntarily to
commit to the protection and management of endangered species
habitat in return for a degree of economic and regulatory certainty
regarding the cost of species and habitat protection.”44  The Assur-
ances Rule was a driving factor in the growth of HCPs in the 1990s—it
provides that, in the case of unforeseen circumstances that require
more mitigation to protect the species, the permit holder will suffer no
further land-use restrictions nor be required to pay further financial
compensation.45  The federal government will then cover any further
expenses related to mitigation.46  These assurances only apply to spe-
cies covered by the HCP, and only if the plan has been properly
implemented.47
Since the 1990s, HCP approvals have decreased significantly.48  This
is largely due to the rising complexity and expense of plans, uncer-
tainty about the future of the Babbitt reforms, and antipathy from the
environmental community about the reforms.49  To be successful, the
process requires those undertaking development to build consensus
among the various stakeholders and interests.50  This is especially true
when the HCP is being developed for a large regional area.51  The
biological issues present are not clear-cut and often require biologists
from the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (“FWS”) to assist in creating a
sufficient plan that will be accepted by the Secretary.52  Many land-
owners and municipalities are reluctant to undertake such huge, ex-
pensive plans, especially when a plan covers millions of acres and
dozens of species.53
In 1999, to address criticisms raised by the environmental commu-
nity, the government established the Five-Point Policy.54  This adden-
dum to the HCP Handbook addresses: “(1) biological goals and
objectives; (2) adaptive management; (3) compliance monitoring and
effectiveness monitoring; (4) permit duration; and (5) enhanced public
41. Thornton, supra note 28, at 94.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 94–95.





50. HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 1–15.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Thornton, supra note 28, at 95.
54. Id. at 96.
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participation.”55  This adaptive management is defined as a “method
for examining alternative strategies for meeting measurable biological
goals and objectives, and then, if necessary, adjusting future conserva-
tion management actions according to what is learned.”56  This ap-
proach appeases the preservationists, but it produces a tension with
the Assurances Rule.57  Adaptive management proposes the notion
that HCPs should be adjusted over time and as new information is
obtained.58  This is in direct contrast with the Assurances-rule notion
that once an HCP is approved and an incidental take permit issued,
the landowner is assured to not be subject to further mitigation ex-
penses apart from those already established in their HCP.59
Another conflict between landowners and preservationists arose
when the FWS adopted the Permit Revocation Rule.60  This change
established that the FWS could revoke an issued incidental take per-
mit if it believes that the approved HCP will, in fact, harm the covered
species, even if the permit holder is not responsible for the harm.61
Landowners could argue that this undermines the Assurances Rule
because, previously, in response to unforeseen circumstances harming
the species, the FWS could not revoke the permit without the permis-
sion of the permittee.62  The FWS could now unilaterally revoke an
incidental take permit.63  For years, the FWS has allowed local agen-
cies that hold area-wide permits to sell sub-permits to third parties to
take covered species under the approved HCP.64  This process is bene-
ficial because it provides a financial incentive to protect habitat and
species, and defers the cost of maintaining the plan for permit
holders.65
Generally, however, HCP implementation has become a process
that landowners would like to streamline.66  Developing an HCP can
create a large burden “for the small developer and landowner; minori-
ties and residents of depressed communities are unlikely to own sizea-
ble tracts of land or engage in large-scale development” and cannot
afford to take advantage of an incidental take permit.67
55. Id.








64. Id. at 99.
65. Id.
66. Young, supra note 22, at 558.
67. Craig Anthony Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The
Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 36 (1991).
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III. ARGUMENTS OF LANDOWNERS
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars the federal gov-
ernment from taking private property for public use without just com-
pensation.68  Recently, courts have construed certain standards under
the law to determine if government regulation or conduct is restricting
a landowner’s property rights too greatly.69  If it is determined that the
restrictions are too great, it usually is considered to be a taking and
the landowner must be paid just compensation.70  A landowner can
make a claim that the ESA section 9 prohibition amounts to a regula-
tory taking without just compensation, which would amount to an un-
constitutional taking of private property.  He or she has been
prevented from developing or utilizing his or her land; this could be
seen as the federal government overstepping its authority.  Industry
groups and property-rights advocates want compensation for land-
owners if species protection restricts their land use.71
Also, landowners are seriously concerned that the Permit Revoca-
tion Rule is an attempt to undermine the Babbitt reforms.72  If these
reforms fade, it is unlikely that landowners will be interested in large,
long-term HCPs.73  As Robert Thornton explains:
At a minimum, any sophisticated landowner is going to be ex-
tremely reluctant to commit to long-term habitat protection and
management in advance of the time that the [incidental take permit]
is effectively vested through the completion of development.  Land-
owners will likely insist that conveyance of legal interests in habitat
to the agencies be phased with the vesting of development rights.74
Lastly, as will be discussed below, the HCP process can be very la-
borious and expensive.  These plans are meant to provide landowners
with an opportunity to develop their land and receive what amounts
to a free pass to lawfully violate the takings prohibition.  Even still,
formulating and implementing an HCP is so expensive that few would
want to undertake the process.  Currently, industry groups are calling
for the process to become more streamlined.75
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Srinath Jay Govindan, “Taking” Steps to Protect Private Property and Endan-
gered Species: Constitutional Implications of Habitat Conservation Planning After Do-
lan v. Tigard, 47 EMORY L.J. 311, 312 (1998).
70. Id.
71. Young, supra note 22, at 558.
72. Thornton, supra note 28, at 97.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Young, supra note 22, at 558.
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IV. JURISPRUDENCE FAVORING LANDOWNERS
Those favoring a limited application of the ESA have successfully
achieved a narrowing of the Act’s protections in the courts.76  Many of
the successful challenges have been directed at the processes the FWS
uses to come to its listing decisions.  In Endangered Species Committee
of the Building Industry Ass’n v. Babbitt, the plaintiffs sued the De-
partment of the Interior because a bird (coastal California gnat-
catcher) had been listed as endangered.77  The building association
challenged the listing because there was conflicting evidence about the
geographical area within which the species resided.78  The court held
that listing the gnatcatcher as a threatened species violated the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act because the Secretary should have made
the underlying data, which was the basis of the decision, available to
the public.79
In another challenge to a listing decision, Arizona Cattle Growers’
Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the FWS issued an incidental
take statement that prevented ranchers from allowing their cattle to
graze in certain areas because they might potentially modify the
habitat of various endangered species, even though the Agency’s own
reports stated that harm to the habitat was unlikely.80  The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that such agency action is arbitrary and capricious because
there was no evidence that endangered species actually existed on the
land in question, and similar actions must be predicated on findings of
incidental takings.81
Courts not only have limited the listing processes, but also struck
down challenges when the FWS has chosen not to list a species at all.
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, environmental groups brought suit
to stop the construction of a school on land that was potentially a
habitat for the cactus ferruginous pygmy owl.82  The school district
had not applied for an incidental take permit.83  First, the court held
that the district was not required to apply for a permit because it did
not believe that its actions would result in a taking of the owl.84  It is
not mandatory for a party to seek a permit, but if their actions do
result in the taking of a listed species, they could suffer civil and crimi-
nal penalties.85  Second, the court held that, based on the evidence
76. Id. at 538.
77. Endangered Species Comm. of the Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Babbit, 852 F. Supp.
32, 33–35 (D.D.C. 1994).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 38.
80. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229,
1233 (9th Cir. 2001).
81. Id.
82. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).
83. Id.at 922–27.
84. Id. at 927.
85. Id.
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presented, the district court was not erroneous in finding that the con-
struction of the school would not result in the take of the pygmy owl.86
V. ARGUMENTS OF PRESERVATIONISTS AND ENVIRONMENTALISTS
From the outset, the environmentalist movement embraced the
Babbitt reforms as a way to promote conservation on private lands by
way of regulatory incentives.87  In recent years though, powerful seg-
ments of the movement are turning against the reforms and issuing a
full legal assault on HCPs and the assurances they provide.88  As one
study indicates, endangered species whose habitat is on private land
are faring much worse than species located on federal land,89 and this
is troubling to environmentalists.  There is anecdotal evidence that
some landowners will actually preemptively destroy habitats in order
to avoid application of the land-use restrictions of sections 7 and 9.90
This problem has been nicknamed “shoot, shovel, and shut up”; and
seriously undermines the efforts to protect endangered species.91
Environmentalists proffer six complaints about conservation
through HCPs:
• HCPs should be required to meet a “recovery” standard—
not just mitigate impacts and ensure survival;
• The agencies should be able to impose additional mitiga-
tion requirements on HCP applicants in the event of new in-
formation or unforeseen circumstances;
• If “no surprises” assurances are provided, the extent of
the assurances should vary in relation to the level of conserva-
tion provided by the HCP;
• HCPs should commit to specified biological objectives and
the plans should be reopened if the biological objectives are
not met;
• HCPs should include scientific peer review; and
• The environmental community should have a greater seat
at the table in HCP negotiations.92
When arguing against the use of HCPs, environmental groups typi-
cally point to a study that supports that HCPs can be scientifically
deficient.93  Sponsored by the American Institute of Biological Stud-
ies, researchers studied forty-three HCPs across the country to deter-
mine the extent to which scientific method and data were used in
86. Id.
87. Thornton, supra note 28, at 95–96.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 94.
90. Wyman, supra note 12, at 506.
91. Id.
92. Thornton, supra note 28, at 96.
93. Id.
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development of the plans.94  But the study merely criticized some of
the HCPs for not consistently monitoring the effects over a long pe-
riod of time and for not properly using biological data.95  The study
focused on older, smaller HCPs and did not look at newer plans that
may utilize better methodology.96  However, the study itself has been
criticized for not using proper methodology.97
VI. JURISPRUDENCE FAVORING PRESERVATIONISTS
AND ENVIRONMENTALISTS
Where resourcists and landowners have successfully challenged the
listing processes and methodologies used to restrict land use, in many
cases, environmental groups have successfully sued to enforce the tak-
ings prohibition of section 9 or won suits brought by developers.  In
some cases, the challenge has been to the issuance of the incidental
take permit even though there was an accepted HCP in place.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Babbitt, environmental groups
sued to stop a large flood mitigation development in California that
had been issued an incidental take permit.98  The proposed dam and
levees were expected to affect the habitat of migratory waterfowl and
the giant garter snake by allowing for urbanization of an area that
previously was not suitable for development.99  The environmental
groups challenged the issuance of the permit because the HCP did not
meet all of the requirements established in section 10.  The plaintiff’s
motions for summary judgment were granted on five of its nine causes
of action.100
Some landowners have attempted and failed to challenge the ESA
on constitutional grounds.  In Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, the de-
veloper’s suit was not challenging the FWS listing processes or admin-
istrative methodologies, but the very power of Congress itself to
regulate the activity.101  In this case, the FWS decided that a develop-
ment in California was going to jeopardize the existence of the arroyo
southwestern toad.102  Instead of developing an HCP, the developer
sued the government challenging the application of the ESA as un-
constitutional under the Commerce Clause.103  The court held that
even though the development was located in only one state, the activ-






98. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
99. Id. at 1277–78.
100. Id. at 1302.
101. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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ity was economic in nature, and regulation through the ESA did not
violate the Commerce Clause.104
In Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Florida,
an action was brought on behalf of two species of sea turtle, claiming
that cars driving on the beach during nesting season were negatively
affecting the turtle population.105  They claimed that the county’s re-
fusal to ban the activity was an unlawful take under the ESA.106  The
county had received an incidental take permit, but takings related to
artificial light from the beachfront were not permitted in the issu-
ance.107  The court held that the county’s permit did not authorize the
take of the turtles “through purely mitigatory measures associated
with artificial beachfront lighting.”108
Cases like Loggerhead Turtle serve to highlight the fact that land-
owners and municipalities are often in the dark about the steps they
must take to lessen the chance of ESA litigation.  It appears that the
slightest oversight during the incidental take permit process can open
them up to claims under the Act.  Further, these cases show that land-
owners are unlikely to succeed in any constitutional claims that they
might bring challenging ESA provisions.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
A. Introduction
The ESA’s sole regulatory restriction on private activity is the tak-
ing prohibition of section 9.109  Aside from that section, the federal
government, through the ESA, does not force landowners into species
protection and recovery, and habitat restoration.110  Most people
would agree that wholesale species slaughter and habitat destruction
should not be permitted.  The ESA is in desperate need of update and
revision—environmentalists, resourcists, and politicians agree on that
at a minimum.111  The problem does not lie solely with the section 9
takings prohibition, which resourcists and landowners view as a case
of government overstepping its bounds.  Neither does the problem lie
with the section 10 incidental take permit, which environmentalists
see as an affront to the entire purpose of the takings prohibition from
the beginning.  Barring the enforcement of these provisions, the ESA
104. Id. at 1069–70.
105. Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty, Fla., 148 F.3d 1231,
1234–36 (11th Cir. 1998).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1258.
108. Id.
109. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538 (West 2012).
110. Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel
of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 288–89 (1998).
111. Young, supra note 22, at 558.
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does not directly address habitat loss at all.112  Further, the Act fails to
address water and air pollution, and exotic species invasion as causes
of species loss and does little to promote conservation of biodiversity
on a geographic scale.113
The Author submits that the response to these issues can be found
when resourcists embrace a philosophy that has been traversing the
ranks of environmentalist groups for the last few years—eco-pragma-
tism.  Both sides of the debate must look to this way of thinking and
accept the inevitability that neither side will ever claim an outright
victory.  If resourcists can adopt a pragmatic view of adaptive manage-
ment they may see, as so many environmentalists have seen, that it is
truly the only way to reconcile the current state of ecology and bal-
ance property rights with preservation.
In 1988, Daniel Farber outlined distinct advantages that legal prag-
matism brings to constitutional law.  The Author believes that these
advantages are also distinctly relatable to environmental law and ef-
forts to balance stakeholder needs in conflicts over HCPs.  Part B of
this Section will summarize this philosophy, and Part C will discuss
Farber’s advantages to legal pragmatism.  Analysis of these advan-
tages may help to persuade those seeking resolution to these conflicts
to view pragmatism in a new light.  There are times when both sides in
a conflict are so entrenched that a pragmatic approach is the only fea-
sible solution.  Part D of this Section will discuss the rise of eco-prag-
matism and how it has come to be viewed in the environmental
community.  Part E will contend that both sides in this debate have
legitimate concerns and neither will ever be able to claim a verifiable
victory in this struggle.  Therefore, landowners must accept that hu-
manity has a stewardship responsibility to every organism, and both
sides must practice a pragmatic approach to the problem.
Further, under current conditions, HCP development is far too cost
prohibitive.  Landowners that may desire to institute an effective plan
are unlikely to finance it when they see how much it will cost them.
This can then lead to the shoot, shovel, and shut up problem men-
tioned previously.  Also, low-income communities may not be able to
afford the cost of HCP implementation.  It is in the great interest of all
involved for Congress to revise the ESA and streamline the proce-
dures that landowners must undertake to receive an incidental take
permit.  In Part F of this Section, the Author will recommend that we
must quiet the complexity of HCPs so that there will be an incentive
for landowners to develop plans that they will actually fulfill, and that
will actually be effective.
112. Jim Chen, Across the Apocalypse on Horseback: Imperfect Legal Responses to
Biodiversity Loss, 17 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 12, 26 (2005).
113. Id.
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B. Legal Pragmatism
As detailed by Daniel Farber, legal pragmatism is an intellectual
movement that attacks foundationalism.114  Farber posits that the phi-
losophy allows legal problems to be solved “using every tool that
comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social
policy;” and that the law “needs no grand theoretical foundation.”115
To the pragmatist, experience is always the best test.116  He rejects
formulaic solutions to difficult constitutional problems and believes
that creativity must be used to arrive at an acceptable solution.117  Re-
garding constitutional law, in 1988, Farber suggested that the recent
prevailing theory on judicial review—foundationalism—actually was
built upon no foundation at all.118  Scholars had been focused on find-
ing a unified principle that could be used as a basis for judicial deci-
sions, but Farber believed that the foundation they were looking for
probably did not exist and, further, that no such foundation was
needed.119  Variously termed intuitionism, practical reason, or pru-
dence, Farber was part of a growing movement of scholars who were
discontent with foundationalism and increasingly embraced a new phi-
losophy of law.120  Preferring the term pragmatism, Farber saw that,
even though many proponents of the philosophy emphasized different
positions, there was common ground to be found in the very impor-
tant tenets of foundationalism rejection, and the emphasis of context,
community, and judgment in judicial review.121  This view was part of
a broad intellectual movement and was being accepted outside of le-
gal circles, as well.122  Some scientists were rejecting “the notion of a
unitary scientific method in favor of nonfoundationalist views of the
scientific enterprise.”123  Philosophers from many disciplines were be-
ginning to realize that for far too long they had been building philo-
sophical towers one brick at a time, and when the foundational brick
collapsed, so did the tower.124  But when the philosophy is supported
by “an interlocking web of belief, in which each belief is supported by
many others rather than by a single foundational ‘brick,’ [it] is inher-
ently far sturdier than a tower.”125
114. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1332–35 (1988).
115. Id. at 1332.
116. Id. at 1341.
117. Id. at 1342.
118. Id. at 1334.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1334–35.
121. Id. at 1335.
122. Id. at 1335–37.
123. Id. at 1335.
124. Id. at 1336.
125. Id.
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To Farber, at the heart of pragmatist thought lies the view that ex-
perience is always the ultimate test.126  This view fits well with the
legal mind because “lawyers are trained to be highly suspicious of glit-
tering generalities and abstract theories.”127  Paraphrasing Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Farber stated that the lawyer’s creed is summarized
in the adage that experience, rather than logic, is the life of law.128
This concept is verified by the case method of teaching law students;
where they are expected to contemplate specific cases rather than
general rules.129
C. Farber’s Advantages of Legal Pragmatism
Farber showed that legal pragmatism has several distinct advantages
over other philosophies.  First, the philosophy “responds to our sense
that some constitutional problems are simply hard and unresponsive
to any present formula; it may take all of our intelligence and creativ-
ity to devise an acceptable solution.”130  Foundationalists aspire to
make law easy by providing a single recipe for all problems con-
fronted, and this recipe will never require calibration to account for
societal change.131  Whereas foundationalists believe that most genu-
ine case conflicts will dissolve in the light of analysis, pragmatists ac-
knowledge that conflicts must be squarely confronted, and cannot be
finessed.132
Second, the pragmatic approach to law is politically healthier than
foundationalism.133  “By encouraging incremental decision making
rather than global remedies, pragmatism reduces the risk of unjusti-
fied radical intrusions into social institutions, and increases the possi-
bility of dialogue between the Court and other segments of
society.”134  Rather than being restricted to a single source for norma-
tive support, legal pragmatism allows judges to appeal to a broad
range of values and they will be better able to build consensus.135
Third, legal pragmatism prompts a requisite concern about the im-
pact of law on society.136  In Farber’s view, judges are far too often
unconcerned about the societal effects of their constitutional rules and
should give more thought to whether decisions “actually further socie-
tal goals such as freedom, equality, and democracy.”137  Contrary to
126. Id. at 1341.
127. Id. at 1342.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis in original).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1342–43.
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what some critics have charged, the pragmatist does not view the past
as a dead hand.138  To the pragmatist, “existing law is not primarily a
collection of texts that requires a struggle to interpret, but rather a
way of thought that a judge has internalized.”139  Instead of being con-
strained by law, they are empowered by legal tradition.140  For
pragmatists, “the question of the advisability of judicial review turns
on its usefulness for promoting a flourishing democratic society—
democratic not just in the sense of ballot casting but also in the sense
that citizens are in charge of the intelligent development of their
lives.”141
D. The Rise of Eco-Pragmatism
Farber applied legal pragmatism principles to environmental law in
what he called eco-pragmatism.142  This new agenda seeks to reshape
environmental policy dialogue and discard the “the bipolar extremism
that has saddled the development of environmental law and policy for
decades.”143  J.B. Ruhl has molded this philosophy to specifically ad-
dress many of the issues in conflict surrounding the ESA and sought
to refine eco-pragmatism to make it directly applicable to species
preservation.144  Ruhl presents rigorous, pragmatic questions that
must be asked: “Is no expense on behalf of endangered species too
great?  Are human rights suspended in order to protect the rights of
other species?  Are all species entitled to this drastic remedial care?
Might helping one species limit our options to help others?”145  To
find solutions to these questions, we must use balanced, practical,
pragmatic approaches.146  Application of pragmatism to environmen-
tal law requires that several fundamental challenges be addressed:
First, all decisions in environmental law involve some trade-off be-
tween costs and benefits in terms of resource allocation and social
welfare.  How do we know when the costs are too much to bear
relative to the benefits?  Second, most decisions in environmental
law address issues to which some degree of scientific uncertainty
attaches.  How do we know what to do when we do not know what
will happen?  Third, even if our policy is based purely on economic
factors, we need to establish some minimum level of environmental
protection in order to sustain the economy.  What is that minimum
level of protection?  Fourth, all environmental law decisions have
consequences in the present and in the future.  How should we
138. Id. at 1346.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1347–48.
142. Ruhl, supra note 37, at 886–87; see generally DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAG-
MATISM (1999).
143. Ruhl, supra note 37, at 887.
144. Id. at 887–88.
145. Id. at 888.
146. Id.
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structure our decision process today so as to fulfill whatever goals
we have for the future?  Finally, the environment, as a constantly
evolving system, will not wait for us to be perfectly happy with our
answers to all the preceding questions.  How do we know when to
promulgate a decision versus when to wait for more information,
input, and deliberation before deciding?147
To address these fundamental challenges and to define the school of
thought, Ruhl presents five pillars of eco-pragmatism.148  He estab-
lishes the first three as a system of core decision-making instruments:
drawing the environmental baseline, institutionalizing the precaution-
ary principle, and integrating impact assessment.149  This system is put
into action using Ruhl’s final two pillars of eco-pragmatism: empiri-
cism and adaptive management.150
One of the guiding principles of classical pragmatism is moral plu-
ralism.151  This tenet, applied to ecology, is a challenge to conven-
tional environmental policy discourse.152  The main thrust of the eco-
pragmatist approach is the “willingness to test and discard theory
where it does not fit the experience, rather than try to shape outcomes
to fit the theory.”153  Empiricism is, therefore, “the glue that holds to-
gether the moral and instrumental components of eco-pragmatism.”154
As important as empiricism is to eco-pragmatism, the Author’s in-
tended focus here is Ruhl’s final pillar: adaptive management.  Nature
is “a complex system and human relations to it [are] therefore equally
as rich and varied.”155  Environmental law must be more dynamic, and
policies that are implemented must take new information into account
and allow for adaptation.156  At the core of adaptive management, are
the principles that ecosystems are inherently unpredictable and can
“exhibit multi-equilibrium states between which the system may move
for unpredictable reasons, in unpredictable manners, and at unpre-
dictable times.”157  Also, because these systems are not static, quality
is not achieved by completely eliminating all change within the sys-
tem.158  The unexpected can, and often does, happen and this makes
predicting outcomes exceedingly difficult.159 “[C]ollecting informa-
tion, establishing measurements of success, monitoring outcomes,
[and] using new information to adjust existing approaches” becomes
147. Id. at 893.
148. Id. at 888, 893.
149. Id. at 894–903.
150. Id. at 903.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 904.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 905.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 906.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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an important part of combatting this unpredictability.160  Management
policy must possess a willingness to change.161  Currently, there is
broad consensus among scholars and resource managers that ecosys-
tem management policy implementation is best achieved through
adaptive management.162  Both resourcists and environmentalists seek
policy with fixed rules and hope to preserve any ground they have
gained in their fight, but adaptive management frameworks are more
experimental, “relying on iterative cycles of goal determination, per-
formance standard setting, outcome monitoring, and standard
recalibration.”163
E. No Verifiable Victory for Either Side
Generally, the Author wholly rejects the notion of moral plural-
ism—the idea that there are no absolutes in knowledge or morality.
Life is not a gray-scale field, devoid of commitment to any truth.
There exists a transcending moral truth.  There are “black-and-white”
conflicts to confront, and they require absolute answers.  Pluralism,
coupled with moral pragmatism, is a scourge on society.  The Author
is not advocating a level of pragmatism that gropes to define some
measure of higher moral truth.  However, when attempting to con-
front the conflicts between resourcists and preservationists the Author
believes a modicum of pragmatism is a necessary approach.  It is
“moral” to desire the protection of species from extinction at the
hands of mankind.  It is “moral” to desire to develop land that you
rightfully own.  These two perspectives are equally valid, yet they can
be diametrically opposed.  Logically, both sides must be flexible so
that a conclusion acceptable to all parties can be achieved.
There is a place in the law for foundationalist thought as well as
pragmatism; these philosophies are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
In fact, is it not the essence of pragmatism for one to believe that
there is not one clear philosophy or perspective on the law?  On the
contrary, it is the height of pragmatism to understand that, based on
the given facts, a foundationalist approach may, at times, be
necessary.
Of course, a discussion of foundationalism versus pragmatism is not
the aim of this Section.  Here, the Author seeks to elucidate the appli-
cation of eco-pragmatism to the battle over the takings provision of
section 9.  This application is of utmost importance if there is to be any
resolution between resourcists and preservationists.  The environmen-
tal movement already has begun to view the issues in an eco-prag-
matic light.  It is now time for resourcists, landowners, and developers
to understand that the issue is too complicated to view solely from a
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 907.
163. Id. at 906–07.
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property-rights perspective.  We must inject realism into the thought-
processes, and all sides must come to the same understanding: There
are varied interests involved and a sustainable solution will require
more than a one-size-fits-all approach to the problem.  Preservation-
ists must accept the facts that humans have thoroughly populated the
planet and are probably not going away any time soon.
There will be times when we will encroach upon a habitat of an
endangered species.  We will do our absolute best to avoid taking said
species, but not all can be saved.  This process is inevitable.  If the
preservationist can accept this, he or she can then focus on taking the
necessary steps that will mitigate the damage as much as possible.  The
pragmatic approach insists that not every animal can be saved, and
preservationists must pick their battles.
The same pragmatic approach can be embraced by resourcists and
landowners.  They must accept the fact that animals are stakeholders
in this process, and as the species on the highest tier of dominion over
this planet, humans hold a grave responsibility to mitigate the taking
of animals and their habitats, even if it means that sometimes we will
not be able to use our land exactly as we would like.  Property rights
are important.  If someone purchases a piece of land, he should be
able to do whatever he wants with it, generally speaking.  In fact, it is
essential to our economy that landowners are allowed to develop their
land.  This is an individualistic country that values property rights.
When the government attempts to control the use of private land,
some may see it as an affront to civil rights.
Government land regulation confronts us on a daily basis.  Local
zoning ordinances tell landowners what they can build on their land
and how to build it, yet, even though some may say this is government
overstepping its bounds, most of us accept it for what it is: government
attempting to prevent the chaos that would ensue if anyone was al-
lowed to build anything they want, anywhere that they want.  After
all, few ranchers would embrace the concept of a new toxic waste
dump adjacent to their land.  The rancher is a stakeholder in the sur-
rounding countryside.  What happens to the land around his ranch af-
fects his ranch.  This is analogous to the habitat of endangered species.
The species that inhabit that land are stakeholders in the land and the
surrounding area.  Just like the rancher, it matters what happens to
the environment.  In the case of the rancher, land-use restrictions
merely lessen the value of his property or affect his livelihood.  But
for the endangered species, encroachment of their habitat can destroy
the species itself.
Landowners and resourcists must take the pragmatic view.  There is
a strong environmental movement in this country that is trying to pro-
tect these species; proponents of change are not going to go away and
leave developers to their own devices.  Just as it is readily accepted by
the public that the government is going to dictate land use through
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zoning ordinances, it must be accepted that the government is not
likely to allow the wholesale destruction of habitats that contain listed
species.  It behooves both resourcists and preservationists to meet the
other side half way in this fight.  They must understand that neither
will ever win outright and that it is best for both sides to concede that
they will not get everything they want; experience tells us this.
Preservationists must accept that they cannot save every single species
of snail that might be on the brink of extinction, and that people have
a right to develop their land within reason.  Landowners must accept
that we, as humans, have a responsibility to do whatever we can to
mitigate the damage to species that our development causes.  Both
sides must accept that HCPs are arguably the most viable vehicles for
achieving the most objectives for both sides of the debate.
F. Quieting the HCP Complexity
As discussed above, the process for designing and implementing an
HCP is so complicated and slow that only large developers can at-
tempt to develop land that contains endangered species.164  Low-in-
come communities are essentially priced out of the opportunity to
develop their own properties.165  The environmentalist focus on the
federalization of land-use controls has adversely affected these impor-
tant stakeholders, who merely wish to improve their circumstances.166
Again, the high expense of HCPs could lead landowners to destroy
habitats preemptively and take species without attempting to mitigate
the damage.167
On paper, the system makes logical sense.  The only way for the
ESA to meet the challenge of protecting endangered species without
trampling fundamental, constitutional property rights is with the inci-
dental take permit option provided in section 10 of the Act.  When
issuing these permits, the viable way to avoid the wholesale destruc-
tion of endangered species is to require that those responsible for the
taking must develop a plan to mitigate the destruction.  This all ap-
pears to flow in a logical direction, to a place where both sides are at
least partially satisfied.  Landowners have the opportunity to use land
that harbors endangered species, and preservationists can take solace
in the fact that there is a plan in place to mitigate damage to the spe-
cies.  The HCP truly is the best solution to the problem.  It is essential
that the system work correctly in order for HCPs to fulfill their in-
tended purpose.  The implementation of these plans has to be cost-
effective so that landowners can consider them.  It is requisite that the
process of obtaining a permit through an HCP be time-sensitive.  Few
communities or landowners possess the resources to wait on the FWS
164. Arnold, supra note 67, at 35–36.
165. Id. at 36.
166. Id.
167. Wyman, supra note 12, at 506.
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to conduct study after study to assess the impact of development.  In-
dustry groups are currently seeking a provision known as self-consul-
tation.168  This would allow federal agencies other than the FWS and
the National Marine Fisheries Service to assess the impact.169  Agen-
cies like the Forest Service could do assessments in areas that fall
under their purview.170  Implementation of ideas like self-consulta-
tion, would allow the entire process to be more efficient, and land-
owners would not avoid HCP development out of fear of an
interminable delay due to the federal bureaucratic machinery, which
could definitely be seen as a danger to the “landowner species.”
An efficient, cost-effective process furthers the causes of all in-
volved.  This Comment does not seek to delve into the depths of de-
tailing exactly how Congress can accomplish a reasonable solution, it
seeks only to emphasize that a reasonable solution is critical.  To pre-
vent unconstitutional land-use restriction, incidental take permits and
the HCPs that accompany them are essential.  To ensure that land-
owners will mitigate damage to endangered species there must be
solid processes in place: federal agencies should follow up on the ap-
proved HCPs to ensure that the landowners are actually fulfilling the
practices detailed in the plan.  All of this must be cost-effective and
rapid enough to encourage landowner compliance.  These are tall or-
ders for Congress to address, but without some change to the status
quo we will be left with a system that holds much promise, but is lan-
guishing in futility.
VII. CONCLUSION
When confronted with two absolutist factions who view their oppo-
sition with enmity, it stands to reason that compromise is the only
recourse.  The road to this compromise is paved with a pragmatic per-
spective.  Preservationists already are conceding that perhaps the sub-
sistence of some species will come at far too great an economic and
civic cost.  Now, landowners need to deliberate in a similar pragmatic
way: perhaps they can consistently consider their stewardship roles
when developing their lands and fully embrace adaptive management.
To date, HCPs have been the best solution developed to address the
concerns of both sides, but if Congress does not find a way to drasti-
cally streamline the process and make it less expensive, owners will
cease to apply.  This will either hinder economic development or
cause the preemptive destruction of listed species.  The ESA will then
cease to perform its intended function and be relegated to exist as the
pit bull statute171 that has no teeth.
168. Young, supra note 22, at 558.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Barry, supra note 4.
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